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October 26, 1954 was a day for constructing ideology. This thesis explores the 
building – successful and not – of ideology on that day in both the United States and the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the form of music and news. In 1954, the GDR 
government and composers allied with the socialist cause began a new cultural 
campaign using musical events and the socialist-realist aesthetic to establish authority 
over the East German population. By promoting their own socialist aesthetic and 
combining it with German cultural traditions, they created a hybrid culture that co-opted 
patriotic prestige from German cultural icons while also promoting a revolutionary, 
anti-capitalist consciousness. Simultaneously, Eisenhower’s administration used 
newspaper articles to disseminate ideological rhetoric. These articles placed the 
American individual in an economic war where their loyalty to capitalism was 
necessary for their very survival. Ultimately, this thesis suggests that an audience’s pre-
established ideology and its associated level of receptivity to new ideological 
considerations are critical to the success or failure of state ideological construction. 
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Introduction: Building Ideology on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain 
“‘But we Yooks, as you know, when we breakfast or sup, spread our bread,’ Grandpa said, with the butter side up. That’s the right, honest way!’”  -Dr. Seuss, The Butter Battle Book  
In the introduction to Becoming East German, Andrew Port compares the 
longevity and stability of East Germany, which collapsed, to that of the Western 
nations, of which most remain in a similar socio-economic system to this day. He poses 
several questions when he reaches this point: Why did the West, with its adherence 
more or less to free market capitalism, experience greater internal support and outlive 
the socialist, more or less non-market system of the German Democratic Republic? 
“Why were the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the other states in the Soviet 
bloc unable to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the masses? And why was the capitalist 
West able to do so? Was it because of the intrinsic appeal of democracy and ‘basic 
freedoms’?”1 He poses three possible solutions to this dilemma. The first suggests that 
the Western system was more adept at providing material necessities and luxuries, 
especially to the groups and people that helped shape public opinion the most. People, 
especially those with power, would be much more likely to support a system that 
consistently put food on their table and provided for their other wants and needs. The 
second theory is that a socialist project run by the Soviet Union simply was not going to 
succeed at that point in history. Nazi propaganda, spread for over a decade before the 
creation of the GDR, made the German population wary of a “Russian” system 
                                                        
1 Andrew Port, Becoming East German (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 22-23. 
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“imposed from without.”2 The final theory, which will become the focus this thesis, 
offers that the “West simply conveyed a more effective message.”3 
I will explore the message on both sides of the Iron Curtain by comparing two 
cultural documents: East German music and U.S. news articles. Initially, music and 
news articles may seem incomparable. After all, these two media are different in form. 
However, by abstracting these two media beyond the specific formal characteristics, 
one can form comparisons. Both are ultimately cultural documents that attempt to 
disseminate information – whether that is expression or “news” – to their audience. This 
information, as will be seen, was laden with ideological suggestions during the Cold 
War. As such, both of these media will be explored as capsules and transmitters of state 
ideology. Thus, instead of comparing the forms’ effectiveness or specific 
characteristics, this thesis will focus on what techniques and methods these media used 
to engage with their audiences. 
This thesis will look at what media and messages - collectively ideology – these 
states employed domestically. The ideology of East Germany will be explored through 
the program text and music of Musikfest des VDK, a music festival held in Leipzig. The 
ideology in United States will be illuminated via an examination of a newspaper 
reprinting of Eisenhower’s speech to the National Security Industrial Association.  
That day, chosen based off of the day of Musikfest – the initial inspiration for 
this project – happens to be October 26, 1954. The day was not particularly special, 
which seems apt for a study of the creation of ideology. I hope to show that ideology 
                                                        
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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can be built in the most mundane fashions as well as extravagant ways, that it pervades 
all forms of communication and expression. I hope this thesis will suggest that ideology 
comes to infiltrate the simplest, benign-looking situations, whether that is clear in the 
text of the ideological object itself or becomes apparent in the interpretations of the 
viewer. On one hand, East Germany attempted to forge a syncretic musical identity and 
convince workers that the revolutionary music signaled a revolutionary new state. On 
the other hand, the Eisenhower administration attempted to simultaneously allay 
people's economic fears and stoke patriotic passion in the mentality that a free market 
driven by individual private interests was the best possible system with coordinated 
news articles and rhetoric. Ultimately, a comparison of these two examples of 
ideological construction will reveal trends in the “game” of socio-political confidence 
as well as the strong relationship between information, experience, and ideological 
construction. 
Rationale and Theory 
The importance of exploring the messages of the Cold War can be explained by 
a comparison to financial panics. A bank run, perhaps the most common financial panic, 
is a situation in which depositors all wish to withdraw their funds located at a specific 
bank because of a sudden decline in confidence in that institution. However, the issue is 
that a bank almost never holds 100% reserves. So once the first wave of depositors has 
reclaimed their money, the bank is often unable to pay out the rest of its depositors. 
Simply put, a bank requires the confidence of their depositors in order to exist. Without 
their confidence, the bank has no funds with which to do business and its function as a 
bank ceases. Of course, in the case of sudden confidence drops, there are ways that 
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banks and states can avoid financial panic and the collapse of the bank. A simple, but 
largely ineffective solution is for the bank to freeze withdrawals. The bank holds all of 
its depositors’ funds so as to not collapse, but it often suffers from large reputational 
issues as a result. Another method is for states or other banks to prop up the institution 
that is experiencing a run. These relief institutions give funds to the bank so that it can 
satisfy enough depositors to the point where the run dies out. That is, news spreads that 
the bank in fact is able to meet all withdrawal demands, and depositors’ panic is 
quelled.4 
A bank run is not entirely different from a crisis of confidence in a state and its 
system. If confidence is maintained, then the state and its system will likely continue to 
exist. Overall, people will go about their days following their established habits. 
However, if paranoia or dissent is suddenly injected into a community, then a crisis can 
occur. Instead of money being removed from a bank until it no longer has any, people 
will either leave a society or dissent until its state identity or system resembles 
something new. Put simply, people will want change because they no longer accept the 
status quo. When this crisis surfaces, it is then up to the state to react. And just like a 
bank, a state that does not wish to collapse can choose, amongst other solutions, to 
freeze withdrawal or to quell the panic with calculated defensive measures that simply 
stop the issue before it snowballs out of control. Of course, in the case of societies, 
funds are human beings and their associated labor. Thus, freezing withdrawal is rather 
like border control measures so often employed by Soviet bloc states where citizens 
                                                        
4 See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1892). 
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would be barred from emigrating. Calculated preventative measures would be 
reassurances from those in power that their society is in fact on the right path, and that 
issues simply do not exist or are easily fixed. 
To return to Port’s original question, perhaps the West employed better 
measures to establish societal confidence and to fight off insurrection. It could be the 
Western message was able to penetrate further and to convince more of its citizenry of 
its legitimacy, gaining their confidence and faith that the Western system would fulfill 
its promises. In other words, the Western message kept domestic affairs running more 
effectively than that of the Soviet Union. 
In any case, both sides of the Iron Curtain needed to expend and expand 
resources so as to spread and maintain their message. This process required state 
institutions to become loudspeakers for these state messages. Domestically, the ultimate 
hope would be to please enough of the population to have a cooperative society. In 
short, states and their respective supporters were hoping to build habits that would 
ideally lead to more supporters or at least a population that was not actively battling the 
state or its system. 
Therefore, Port’s conception of “message” may be illuminated by comparing it 
with Louis Althusser’s conception of ideology. Althusser sees society as a place where 
“individuals in question ‘go’, and that it is ideology which makes them ‘go’.”5 With the 
help of state institutions, ideology runs individuals and is reproduced by their actions 
taken on a daily basis. In this outlook, are two main points: Ideology is individuals’ 
imaginary relationship with their real conditions of existence; and ideology has material                                                         
5 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism (Brooklyn: Verso Books, 2014), 180. 
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existence in the physical actions that humans take.6 In other words, a person, believing 
in certain ideas, will act in accordance with those ideas and inscribe those ideas within 
the acts of their material practice.7 Thus, it can be said that ideology makes a pleased or 
placated individual “go” in the sense that they reflect their support of or resignation to 
that ideology in their behavior and habits. Althusser explains that these ideologies are 
formed with the help of distinct institutions. Two types of institutions help maintain 
state ideology. State ideological apparatuses (government propaganda programs, 
cultural unions, etc.) build textual arguments while state repressive apparatuses 
(military, police, etc.) enforce the ideology or repress active detractors. Thus, ideology 
also includes the material reality and practices of these institutions. Therefore, the full 
definition of ideology is that which exists in a “material ideological apparatus, 
prescribing material practices regulated by a material ritual, which practices exist in the 
material acts of a subject acting in all good conscience in accordance with his belief.”8 
As Althusser notes, the entire system of ideology proposed here leads to concrete 
individuals becoming “believers” or at least concrete subjects of ideology.9 As their 
lives are subjected to the actions that are defined by their ideological standpoint, they 
form habits that define their experience and interpretation of events. Under this 
definition, a person attending a concert or someone reading their morning newspaper 
can be seen as a subject of the didactic information present in such a medium. Through 
coercion or not, these individuals chose to participate in these cultural activities. And 
                                                        
6 Ibid., 181-184. 
7 Ibid., 185. 
8 Ibid., 187. 
9 Ibid., 185. 
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individuals during the Cold War chose how to behave based on their own ideology, an 
ideology that was likely intertwined with state messages and material rituals. By using 
this definition, this thesis will necessary focus on material rituals, the institutions that 
support them, and their “subjects.” An exploration of the ideologies during the Cold 
War will be an examination of the “messages” at that time. 
How did states attempt to convince their domestic populations that indeed they 
were already on the side where the grass was greener? That is, the grass already under 
their feet was the greenest and that experimentation with the "other side" was, at best, 
foolhardy because their state already had the best knowledge and at worst, treasonous. 
Hoping to avoid coercion – which both states arguably employed at different points 
anyway – they needed, to use Port's word, a message to convince their populations that 
a shared advantage could be found in the future of each respective system; they needed 
an ideology that would make things "go," to use Althusser's thinking. Music and news 
articles became transmitters of that ideology in the Cold War. 
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Chapter I: The East Side 
“And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong, and is looking away from the truth? Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.” -Socrates speaking to Glaucon, Plato’s Republic 
Plinko, Semiotics, and Socialism 
Plinko, the forerunner to pinball, seemingly has little to do with socialist-realist 
music. In the game, the contestant takes her tokens and one by one places them in the 
Plinko board, a large, upright board with only one entry point where pegs redirect the 
token’s path of descent. Eventually, the token reaches the bottom of the board where 
nine outcomes are possible. Each outcome is associated with a prize. Of course, once 
the token is let go, it cannot be interfered with, therefore, there is seemingly no strategy 
involved. In no way is the game random, though. With single-entry Plinko boards (not 
the eight-entry type seen on The Price is Right), the probability of the token landing in 
each outcome follows a bell curve.10 That is, an outcome’s likelihood decreases the 
farther it is from the center. However, what if contestants were given planks of wood 
that they could place in the board before dropping their token, effectively negating pegs 
that might otherwise redirect the token in the wrong direction? The older probability 
would be subverted. With even small alterations to the board, entire outcomes could be 
removed. And if contestants could make major alterations, they would then be able to 
funnel the token towards their desired result. If their planks were long enough, 
contestants could guide the token with 100% accuracy. In effect, by controlling the 
                                                        
10 Plinko is often used in elementary schools to explain probability. See Plinko, Probability, and Pascal, 
Haws, 1995. 
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intermediary steps between the drop and the final outcome, the contestants could 
effectively engineer the results. 
While the American philosopher and scientist Charles Sanders Peirce likely 
never knew of Plinko, the similarities between his theory of semiotics and the game are 
illuminating. The process of semiotics (interpretations of signs) can be thought of as the 
explanation of how signs are interpreted by a group of people whose Plinko boards, so 
to speak, already have alterations. Peirce first wrote about semiotics, the study of signs 
and symbols, in 1867. In his early work, Peirce established many categories of signs, 
which can be reduced to icon, index, and symbol. An icon represents the real object by 
similarity. For example, a drawing of a tree signifies a tree purely through a simple 
resemblance. An index can occur via factual or concurrent experiential associations. An 
index is what explains the “Honey, they are playing our song!” phenomenon. For 
example, a song may become an index of particular emotions or associated with a loved 
one because one felt those emotions or shared a moment with that person while the song 
was playing. Finally, a symbol represents a learned, denotational association. 
Interpretations and behavior associated with traffic signs, for example, represent simple 
symbolic associations because we have agreed as a society about what they mean. 
Peirce’s unfinished writings on semiotics established a relational triangle, or 
trichotomy, that could help explain the interpretation of any sign or symbol. That is, 
there is a three step process to the interpretation of every sign. First, there must be an 
interpreter, a person present who will be the one to connect a sign to an object. Second, 
the interpreter needs to recognize the sign as a sign. Without this, no signifying will 
occur. This connection is heavily dependent on the interpreter’s past experiences or lack 
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thereof with that sign. Third, the interpreter must connect the sign to a real or abstract 
object. Finally, the interpreter interprets the sign. The interpretation is key as it can 
bring on emotions, memories (“Honey, they are playing our song!”), or even physical 
action (braking one’s car). 
Thus, the game of Plinko occurs with every sign that people run into. Traffic 
signs, language, visual art, and music all use signs, which can be thought of as Plinko 
tokens. Past experiences with these signs (iconic, indexical, or symbolic) can be thought 
of as alterations that guide the token to a specific range of results or to a single one. In 
other words, these signs and symbols enter our brains and are funneled to a certain 
result because of years of learned behavior, indexical associations, or iconic similarities. 
And because of our shared social experiences (living in the same nation, having similar 
educations, etc.) general interpretational trends begin to appear. Therefore, even though 
outcomes will not follow the bell curve, output trends (the “norm”) will often appear or 
can be assumed. When a driver sees a stop sign, she stops or at least recognizes that the 
sign suggests she should bring her car to a halt. Does this mean that everybody 
recognizes stops signs and follows the symbolic action associated with it? Certainly not, 
but the majority of people recognize the symbol. In other words, they are familiar with 
the ideology and its associated material rituals, even if they do not follow it at all times 
or ever. When it comes to music, interpretational trends are established to musical 
icons, indices, and symbols. As Loren Kajikawa demonstrates in Sounding Race in Rap 
Songs, the rap group Public Enemy established connections between their sonic 
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characteristics and a new brand of political militancy by taking advantage of samples 
from pre-existing records.11  
As musicologist Thomas Turino has stated about Peirce’s theory, every musical 
sound, performance, dance movement, or contextual feature is a sign.12 And as 
Germany became East and West Germany through political forces as opposed to 
national, cultural, or linguistic movements, composers in the socialist state began to 
form a new system of cultural signs and to alter older ones to guide the Plinko tokens to 
a new ideology. The new signs would have to infiltrate spaces occupied by established 
signs. The older signs, with all of the symbolic, indexical, and iconic baggage coming 
from the era of the Third Reich, would need to be redirected or removed. East German 
composers and cultural officials wanted to use events like Musikfest to reconstruct 
citizens’ musical sign associations by redirecting and ultimately funneling their 
interpretations of all icons, indices, and symbols towards socialist definitions of society 
and culture. 
Social Rupture and Cultural Engagement in the GDR 
On June 17, 1953, workers filled the streets of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) violently protesting against the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED) 
government following several months of unpopular labor laws and fomenting anger. 
The protesters took over government buildings and even got into firefights with East 
                                                        
11 See Loren Kajikawa, Sounding Race in Rap Songs (Oakland: UC Press, 2015). 
12 Thomas Turino, "Peircean Thought As Core Theory For A Phenomenological Ethnomusicology," 
Ethnomusicology 58, No. 2 (2015): 188. 
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German police and Soviet soldiers.13 Certain protesters carried national banners and 
sang “the old German fascist hymn” as they rambled the streets.14 The SED police 
infrastructure did not have the resources to quell the furor. As the country slipped into 
chaos, Soviet tanks bolstered the SED. Martial law was declared.15 The Russian 
reinforcements effectively quashed the uprising, but only after the SED government had 
made huge concessions concerning the new labor laws.16 A tenuous return to order 
followed in the subsequent days. The GDR politicians, who had been completely taken 
by surprise and were still bewildered, returned to their offices and began devising how 
to fix the country. 
The uprising scared the ruling party, who had almost lost power after a few days 
of protest. With the knowledge that the protests were made up of people from the entire 
length of the political spectrum, it seems that the government had either done its job too 
well or not at all. The anti-fascist campaigns of the 1940s had not sufficiently removed 
Nazi elements from the country. And those protesters that were not fascists were 
revolutionaries that had used their skills to almost cause a popular revolution against the 
“revolutionary” government itself. 
Amidst the deep irony of the situation, the SED party set about coming up with a 
plan that would restore order. The threat of tanks kept people from organizing in public, 
but politicians had to reorder the nation in a way so as to avoid similar violent uprisings 
                                                        
13 Vasilli Sokolovski et al, “On the Events of 17-19 June 1953 in Berlin and the GDR” in Uprising in 
East Germany, 1953 ed. Christian F Ostermann (Budapest: Central European Press, 2001), 261. 
14 Ibid., 271. 
15 Ibid. 
16 In Althusser’s thinking, because the security forces reestablished centralized control, ideology was 
maintained here by repressive state apparatuses. 
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in the future. It appears that at this point GDR officials fully examined the 
recommendations and warnings that Soviet authorities had been sending them in the 
lead up to the protests. Just fifteen days before the uprising, Soviet advisors had sent a 
document titled “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the 
GDR.”17 Russian advisors claimed the very first measure was to improve the material 
situation of the country. The GDR had been experiencing a major emigration crisis 
where people of all classes and sectors were leaving the country for the West because 
of, the Soviets claimed, a lack of necessities.18 Out of a population of roughly 18 
million, an unprecedented 120,000 had left in the first six months of 1953.19 The 
country was suffering as a result, or at least Soviet advisors felt it was and they ordered 
the GDR government to fix the situation. To help solve this issue, the advisors 
recommended that the SED end forced collectivization and the war on private 
enterprise.20 Similarly, despite the detriment to heavy industry, they suggested that the 
SED revise its Five-Year Plan so as to loosen political and judicial controls.21 They 
even denounced the GDR Chairman Walter Ulbricht’s “cold exercise of power.”22 They 
also suggested a removal of unpopular and incompetent leaders of the party and state.23 
They would be replaced by young comrades who would have a greater connection to 
the working classes, laboring peasants, and intelligentsia. In the future, measures taken 
                                                        
17 “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR,” in Uprising in East 
Germany, 1953 ed. Christian F. Ostermann (Budapest: Central European Press, 2001), 133. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 135. 
21 Christian F. Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953 (Budapest: Central European Press, 2001), 
18. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “On the Events of 17-19 June 1953,” 282. 
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by the SED government needed to be “understood by the people and [met] with support 
from the population itself.”24 The government should also elevate its puppet 
organizations’ presence in the “social life of the GDR”.25 In contemporary terms, the 
Soviet advisors saw the need for a public relations campaign. It was clear to them that 
the SED “displayed complete ignorance of the masses, lack of connection with the 
classes, an inability to speak to the people.”26 The SED party needed to connect with the 
working class to avoid another popular revolution. 
The hopes of improving relations with the working class also caused cultural 
and social readjustments in the following years, including changes in state policy on 
music. The GDR government was to reduce its persecution of religious remnants in the 
country so as to limit the animosity created between a deeply entrenched Protestant 
community and the SED party.27 While the SED government moved away from certain 
sectors, they moved to become more active in others by organizing more cultural 
events, but while also relinquishing much control that had caused earlier frustration. 
Cultural officials declared that artists had “complete freedom.”28 Leaders in the various 
musical organizations echoed the call for more artistic autonomy while also reaffirming 
their commitment to socialist-realism. What was new was that they felt cultural officials 
should use persuasion or constructive criticism instead of force to convince artists of the 
primacy of socialist-realism and to support them even if they were not amenable.29 In                                                         
24 “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR,” 135. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Pravda Correspondent P. Naumov to Dimitrii Shepilov, “Report on the Events in Berlin on 16 and 17 
June 1953,” in Uprising in East Germany, 1953, ed. Christian F. Ostermann (Budapest: Central European 
Press, 2001), 207. 
27 “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR,” 136. 
28 David G. Tompkins, Composing the Party Line (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2013), 62. 
29 Ibid. 
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certain cases, it seems the population took advantage of the new cultural opportunities. 
The 1955-56 East German opera season included 5,948 performances which were 
attended by over 4 million visitors while the 1952-53 season had 800 fewer 
performances and 18% fewer visitors.30  
By no means, however, was the SED’s interest in how culture could serve the 
socialist revolution and alter the lives of its constituents new. One of the first post-war 
ideological decrees came in 1951 when the SED declared their campaign against 
formalism, the aesthetic ideology the party felt helped the spread of non-socialist ideas. 
In its place, the government promoted socialist-realism, an aesthetic originally 
developed in Soviet Russia.31 While the socialist-realist aesthetic is difficult to define, 
Ernst Hermann Meyer, the top musicologist in the GDR, defined it as any work that was 
“formed through personal experience, personality, and individual ideas, thoughts and 
feelings, and with content that is meant for working people.”32 Cultural debates during 
1950-52 had established this definition.33 Ernst Hermann Meyer claimed that 
formalism’s focus on form and method led its works to lack “cherished feelings” and 
any “recognizable melody.”34 Socialist-realism, on the other hand, was “not engaged in 
abstract experimentation, but [provided] strength for people to solve today’s 
problems.”35 Socialist-realism would also be “national in form.”36 However, cultural 
                                                        
30 Heinz Alfred Brockhaus and Konrad Niemann, Musikgeschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik Sammelbände 5 (Berlin: Verlag Neue Musik, 1979), 81. 
31 Esther von Richthofen, Bringing Culture to the Masses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 31. 
32 Tompkins, Composing the Party Line, 21. 
33 Brockhaus and Niemann, Musikgeschichte der DDR, 66-7. 
34 Peggy Klemke, Taktgeber oder Tabuisierte – Komponisten in der DDR (Berlin: Tectum Verlag, 2007), 
60. 
35 Tompkins, Composing the Party Line, 21. 
36 Ibid. 
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officials and composers alike warned composers to not focus on form too much. A 
preoccupation with form would lead to a designation of “formalism,” a label popularly 
applied during the period to anything remotely Western or American.37 
Structural changes led to centralized oversight of the cultural realm before 1953. 
For instance, the Vereine system, whereby all social and cultural clubs were required to 
register with a factory, institution or mass organization, helped to centralize cultural 
pursuits and weed out dissent.38 Thus, the SED government had institutionalized control 
and to a certain extent dealt with dissidents. So while there was a definite thaw in 1953, 
the cultural sector posed less of a threat to the SED government than it had just five 
years prior, perhaps making it easier for officials to justify a “hands-off” approach. 
Out of the pre-1953 period but destined to play a major role in 1954 came the 
Verband Deutscher Komponisten und Musikwissenschaftler (VDK), the central 
composer’s union of the GDR. Founded in April 1951, the organization’s main pursuits 
were promoting the careers of its members, uniting the East German people, and the 
building of socialism in the GDR, even if it meant using ideologically asynchronous 
rhetoric and groups.39 The founding members were some of the most popular socialist-
realist composers and musical thinkers of the entire nation, notably the composers 
Ottmar Gerster, Rudolf Wagner-Régeny and the musicologist Ernst Hermann Meyer.40 
A large poster behind the delegates at the founding congress of the VDK declared “a 
                                                        
37 Certain American composers embraced “formalism” as a symbol of their individuality and creative 
genius, a tactic which distinguished their work from Communist music. See Richard Pells, Modernist 
America : Art, Music, Movies, and the Globalization of American Culture (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2011). 
38 Richthofe, Bringing Culture to the Masses, 31. 
39 Brockhaus and Niemann, Musikgeschichte der DDR, 73. 
40 Ibid., 73-4 
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volk is nothing without an honest, great art, the art is nothing without the volk.”41 The 
use of volk could very well have appealed to all sectors of East German society. 
Nationalists and centrists would have recognized the sign from the Nazi era, while 
socialists could have understood it as a reference to the revolutionary proletariat. Thus, 
it seems that from the beginning these GDR composers were interested in co-opting 
Nazi signs and placing them in a new socialist context. 
The necessary cultural infrastructure and ideologies existed and the post-1953 
government had extra impetus to disseminate and promote party doctrine throughout the 
country, particularly to the restless working class. The question within the government 
was: What was the best way for the government and its centralized organizations to 
support this effort within the musical community? Part of the answer was to continue 
music festivals that promoted new socialist-realist pieces and could serve as an avenue 
of entertainment, cultural stimulation, and possibly indoctrination. The promotion of 
music festivals would also help establish the socialist-realist genre and subsequently 
push other less desirable genres from the spotlight. It seems the regime was seeking to 
establish cultural domination. 
The Musikfest des VDK in 1954 was planned as an event that could both display 
the new aesthetic to the public and also allow the elite musicians to ingratiate 
themselves with workers. The festival was to be held in Leipzig on October 26 and 27 
as part of a new “cultural offensive” in the fall of 1954 that, while not a return to the 
hardline years of the early GDR, was meant to show support for the government’s 
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cultural objectives.42 It was clear that the festival was meant to be a new kind of musical 
event: socialist-realism and all its potential for creating a new, unified socialist state 
would be the central focus and theme. Leading up to the festival, many composers and 
musicologists, including Meyer came out in support of the government’s firm position 
on socialist-realism as the pinnacle of artistic expression.43 The stage was set for a 
festival that could, according to GDR politicians and VDK members, change the very 
consciousness of the country. 
Officials in Berlin attempted to heavily control the selection process for the 
event, including planning and executing of the festival’s lineup, so as to ensure that only 
the best socialist-realist pieces would make it into the program.44 These SED-linked 
musicologists and composers offered advice on each genre that was to be represented at 
the festival. Perhaps upon recommendation from Soviet advisors, they sought pieces 
that were ideologically congruous with state views on musical production.45 The central 
doctrine suggested that pieces should be nationalist in form and socialist in content, be 
accessible for all audiences, and create an atmosphere of optimism. By establishing a 
hardline in the musical sector, the officials hoped that this tactic would send a message 
to the entire population of GDR composers: write socialist-realist music or never have 
your pieces performed in grand public events.46 
Whether by incompetence or by deliberate rebellion, the Leipzig branch of the 
VDK flouted some of these recommendations. The VDK leadership made noticeable 
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changes to the Berlin committee’s guidelines.47 While ultimately using the state’s 
recommended rhetoric, it seems that the VDK chose what pieces they wished.48 In 
arguments that would arise after the event, the Berlin committee criticized the Leipzig 
selections as too experimental.49 However, it is important to consider why the VDK 
would disregard state advice, or at least appear to. 
The Leipzig VDK genuinely embraced the chance to solidify cultural 
connections between socialism and German heritage. While perhaps unknowingly, it 
seems they attempted to accomplish what Soviet advisors had suggested just over a year 
prior: reconnect with the German people. The Musikfest would be a music festival, but, 
more importantly, also be a machine for uniting the German people. The cogs in this 
machine would be socialist-realist works that combined national and socialist elements.  
Despite the socialist-realist criticism of formalism, composers still focused on 
selecting specific forms to showcase at Musikfest because of their patriotic potential. In 
mid-September, members of the VDK’s Leipzig branch wrote internal memos to one 
another about what genres were the best to show at the festival and why. The Leipzig 
officials decided upon a list of the three most important genres: 
1. The large symphonic form – especially the opera 
2. the mass-song 
3. the dance music50  
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According to the internal memos, composers chose these forms as they “undoubtedly” 
represented national forms.51 The Leipzig branch saw these genres as tools to be used in 
their “national task” of creating a united Germany.52 These forms were to be 
particularly helpful at finding a solution to the “issue of national intonation in German 
music.”53 In other words, the Leipzig branch suggested that by finding the 
quintessential Germanic sound and forms, they could bring about a unified socialist 
Germany. It was their mission to combine the “success of the Soviet Union and the 
volk’s democracy” and national forms into socialist-realist musical pieces.54 In effect, 
the musical uniting of these two concepts would help create unity on a real-world 
political scale. The potential unity would be tested at Musikfest the following month. 
With each piece, each audience member would interpret the signs that they recognized. 
A Plinko game would take place with each audience member and where the token 
landed depended on their personal and shared social experiences with music. In the end, 
the majority of these outcomes would need to be positive for the audience to react well 
and for Musikfest to be a success. 
Steps Taken to Guide the Plinko Token at Musikfest and How They Failed 
On October 26, 1954, Musikfest opened with an evening program consisting of 
four handpicked socialist-realist pieces: 
Rudolf Wagner-Régeny – Opera Suite from “Persian Episode” 
Helmut Riethmüller – Divertimento for piano and horns 
Günter Raphael – Sinfonia breve                                                         
51 Ibid. [zweifellos] 
52 Ibid. [nationale Aufgabe] 
53 Ibid. [der Frage der nationalen Intonation in der deutschen Musik] 
54 Ibid. [der Erfolge der Sowjetunion und der Volksdemokratien] 
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Ottmar Gerster – Sinfonie No. 2 (Thüringische)55 
The names included some of the heavy-hitters of the GDR socialist-realist camp. 
Ottmar Gerster and Rudolf Wagner-Régeny would have been known by locals and 
music enthusiasts. With these choices, it is not immediately apparent how they fit into 
the VDK’s efforts to find a national musical voice. To remedy this situation, the 
program, explained symbolic associations for most of the music present at Musikfest. In 
this case, all of the definitions were to be patriotic and revolutionary.  
Therefore, the VDK had to bill the pieces and the event as the culmination of 
Germanic and socialist culture. The mayor of Leipzig and Ottmar Gerster, the VDK 
chairman, provided forewords in the Musikfest program that partially fulfilled these 
efforts. With memories of the 1953 protests still fresh, the forewords emphasized the 
event’s potential for building stronger, more transparent connections with the GDR 
people. It certainly seems that Gerster had the prior unrest in his mind as he wrote his 
foreword. He mentioned how he hoped the event would mirror Bach who, despite living 
in “a time of deep national humiliation and splintering,” composed highly spirited 
works.56 This statement about a nationally treasured composer overcoming the 
difficulties of his time to create masterpieces would likely have drawn comparisons in 
the audience’s mind to the GDR’s socialist-realist composers and the recent social 
upheaval. Gerster also wrote that the Musikfest stage would allow East German 
composers to “speak in openness and receptiveness over the many questions and 
problems of our musical creations.”57 Gerster hoped that the music “of the realization of                                                         
55 “Kongress und Musikfest: 1954,” ZA 37473, Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, 16. 
56 Ibid., 2. [einer Zeit tiefer nationaler Erniedrigung und Zersplitterung] 
57 Ibid. [In Offenheit und Aufgeschlossenheit] [Fragen und Probleme unseres musikalischen Schaffens 
aussprechen] 
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our communal aim” would speak a “language understood by all.”58 He went on to say 
that the Musikfest works would “speak to millions of Germans in [the] east and west.”59 
In other words, no longer would only the elite and bourgeois enjoy classical music; 
workers would understand the music as well.  
Hans Uhlich, the mayor of Leipzig, echoed Gerster’s sentiments. He claimed the 
festival would “widen and consolidate cultural relationships” as well as serve the 
“volk’s friendship.”60 Thus, in the program itself the Soviet advisors’ 1953 directives 
appear to have been at least attempted, if not fulfilled. The aims of Musikfest was first 
and foremost dialogue with the workers. Thus, the program attempted to claim the event 
itself was a symbol of cultural triumph and goodwill between artists and citizens. 
Gerster’s foreword also discussed the VDK’s search for a national intonation. 
The VDK chairman seemed to see music as a cultural bastion that could reinvigorate 
national and socialist loyalties. That is, with all of the communal fragmentation, the 
people of Germany should return to their cultural stronghold of music so as to fight off 
internal and external enemies. As he wrote, music would “break down the concern-
fulfilling forces of destruction and alienation in our fatherland.”61 Therefore, while so 
many political forces had joined together to divide Germany and now turned their focus 
to dividing East Germany, Germans could always count on their “indivisible German 
culture” to hold the nation and its people together.62 He hoped that this “sonic 
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recognition” would allow the Germans to “make out of our homeland undivided care-
states.”63 In other words, the German people’s reintroduction to the quintessential 
Germanic sonic characteristics would not only unite them under one state, but also 
create care-states, a synonym for socialism. The statement implied a deeper, more 
pointed claim: what the audience was about to hear was the nation in sonic form. The 
pieces were to be symbols of the nation. Clearly, the program attempted to alter the 
Plinko board so as to effect the audience’s interpretational outcomes.64 
The attempts to teach new symbolic associations became more obvious with 
rhetoric about specific pieces. Because of the socialist-realist focus on content instead 
of form and the VDK’s national music project, the Musikfest program offered 
explanations for how these pieces’ contents were meant to be supporting the socialist 
movement and patriotic German unity. The program noted Wagner-Régeny’s work as a 
scathing review of capitalism. The operatic suite was made from parts of the opera 
“Persian Episode,” a collaboration between Wagner-Régeny and the poet Bertolt 
Brecht. The program’s explanation focused on Brecht’s text, which was not performed 
at Musikfest itself, but was perhaps required for audiences to understand the political 
implications of the now-textless work. The program called the original opera’s text “a 
sharp satire of the setting capitalist society.”65 Then, in terms not dissimilar from that of 
the Nazi period, the program explained how the text reflected the music.66 The piece 
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had “jazz elements throughout” that embodied “frivolities” and “love for purchasable 
goods.”67 However, the program noted that the artificial “merriness” and capitalist 
characteristics of the piece were meant to be ironic and “reproachful.”68 One was meant 
to apply these symbolic definitions despite the absence of the text, the element which 
would normally create the association. 
The program offered the sections’ titles to further highlight the message of the 
piece. The work’s sections include the “Battle of Two Predators.”69 The program noted 
that the “predators” were in fact businessmen and gentlemen at a social gathering.70 The 
section featured a “brutal stomping dance” that suggested the “violence and meanness 
of the ‘predators’.”71 The suite also included the “Music of the Great Sharks.” This 
section was described in similar terms. It was described as “brutal” and “jazzy,” with 
uncomfortable motives that contrasted against a “viciously agitated” melody.72 
Seemingly, the program left few musical signs up to the audience’s interpretation and 
indicated pieces were meant to be hyper-programmatic. 
The program also featured an explanation of Gerster’s Sinfonie, however, the 
explanation now came from the composer himself. In a less than subtle way, Gerster 
tied his music to both Germany’s cultural past and socialism. Gerster billed his 
symphony as one that displayed his love of homeland. He claimed his aim was to 
capture the life and land of Thuringia in his work, not an ideal. He saw the region as a 
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“land pulsing with life, the liveliest presence and the greatest, specifically for a typical 
German past.”73 He then mentioned various cultural signs from the region, including 
Luther, Bach, and Goethe and how these cultural figures, while dead, still “campaign, 
struggle, and work for the progress of the people in Thuringia today.”74 Thus, 
Germany’s cultural past had been and remained a friend of the people. Also, because of 
their support of the people, Gerster implied that these cultural signs no longer should 
only be thought of as great Germans, they were also great socialists. While still holding 
all of their national, cultural, and social clout, Bach and Luther had become comrade 
Bach and comrade Luther. Clearly, efforts were put into controlling the symbolic effect 
of these musical works.  
The use of strong, pre-established national signs also suggests the primacy of 
nationalism during the period. Patriotic Germans seemed to have been the main 
protestors in 1953, so nationalism remained a potent force that could be an enemy or 
become an ally. With the appeal to so many national signs, it appears that composers 
and Musikfest organizers were attempting the latter. The composer’s union was 
prepared to meet East Germans at their impenetrable cultural stronghold, to befriend the 
defenders with beautiful music, and to eventually use its power for their own 
campaigns. 
Despite all of this extra-musical rhetoric, the festival appears to have fallen upon 
deaf ears. Luckily, because of the state’s interest in controlling the cultural sector, they 
sent informants to watch the concert’s proceedings and to report on its reception. Their 
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reports provide specific glimpses into the atmosphere. For example, an audience 
member told a government informant that a large portion of the audience left halfway 
through the performance.75 Similarly, two female workers from Leipzig enjoyed 
Gerster’s composition, but called the other works “Dreadful! Horrible!”76 The criticism 
of the three other works appears to have been constant. Attendees claimed that “there 
was no heart or soul” in the non-Gerster compositions.77 One went so far as to claim 
that Raphael’s work sounded as if there were “children pounding on a piano.”78 As 
such, “[the musical works] will never appeal to workers, never!”79 
What about these pieces garnered such criticism? By performing a textless 
version, the program’s signifying definition of Wagner-Régeny’s operatic suite could 
not as clearly defined and transmitted. In the original form, text would have helped 
convey the meaning and significance of the work. As such, the transmission of its 
political message was greatly hindered. While lacking part of its original semiotic 
potential, the work was not completely bereft of dynamism. The operatic suite, true to 
the rhetoric in the program, was rather spastic. Not only was the work spliced together 
from disparate parts of a much larger work, but the melodies, tempos, and sonic 
atmospheres clashed in a way that negates any type of perceptible form.80 The 
compositional technique helped build energy, but to no end in particular. At best, a 
crowd member would have been excited by the piece, but still would not recognize the 
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piece as a sign, the first step in Peirce’s trichotomy. At worst, it could have seemed like 
an overwhelming display of pointless bravado, therefore becoming indexically 
connected to negative feelings. The work was meant to criticize capitalism, but how 
was a worker to iconically or indexically interpret a deliberately sarcastic operatic suite 
as signifying the violent ridiculousness of capitalism and the greatness of socialism? 
The program assured them of this, but their emotions and memories told them that this 
work was not enjoyable. Therefore, the failure to communicate the opera’s original 
message was based on a failure of performance, where the sign was lost in transmission 
and habitual responses prevailed.  
Raphael’s work suffered from similar issues. Sinfonia breve demanded attention. 
Raphael’s composition used many Stravinskian elements, which may have disturbed 
listeners. For example, a driving, archaic rhythm pervaded the work from the first 
measure.81 The pervasive rhythm shunted the melody and harmonic structure from the 
spotlight. Even if the melody were dominant, its own disunity could have been harsh to 
the ear. It consisted of large leaps and short motives that differed greatly from the 
melody found in Gerster’s composition.82 Thus, the sonic character came off as stilted, 
as if the entire work was leaning forward. As with Wagner-Régeny’s work, energy was 
well established, but this was at the expense of formal recognition and the potential for 
being a relaxing work. Perhaps the composition’s insistence for an engaged audience 
was its downfall. 
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It seems the revolution’s soundtrack was too revolutionary. The criticized pieces 
were more focused on rhythm, complex harmonic structure, and subversion of typical 
formal characteristics. In short, while still being recognized as classical, these works 
were meant to defy expectations and force the audience to listen, tactics which failed to 
garner support. In other words, the majority of the audience’s Plinko boards had 
predetermined funnels which led to negative reactions for these sonic characteristics. 
The apparent failure can be explained by the other two semiotic categories: icon and 
index. It seems that the three criticized works did not appeal to the audience because 
they did not create enough of an indexical-emotional connection. As stated, they lacked 
“heart.”83 This would never do for workers. The audience’s pre-established, personal 
iconic and indexical associations with the specific forms and sonic characteristics found 
at Musikfest were too engrained and too negative to persuade them to enjoy the concert. 
The established alterations in the audience’s personal Plinko boards were too sturdy to 
be subverted by the idyllic rhetoric found in the program so they simply guided the 
token to whatever outcome was likely based on their past experiences and semiotic 
associations. Unfortunately for the concert organizers, these were overwhelmingly 
negative. 
On the other hand, Gerster’s work – a tonally-simple, mild-mannered symphony 
– found favor with parts of the crowd. It seems with this accessibility he corralled 
enough positive sign associations for audience members to accept his work. Many of 
the audience members would have been familiar with the genre of symphony. However, 
unlike the other works, Gerster did not try to subvert the audience’s expectations. In                                                         
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fact, arguably the work would have felt quite “natural.” The main theme was long, 
flowing and placed over a similarly non-imposing orchestral background.84 The basic 
tonal language of the Western tradition was ever present in Sinfonie 2, while it was not 
with the other works. Simple, hummable melodies existed over smooth, idiomatic 
harmonic structures and explained Gerster’s assertion that his work was a tone-painting 
of the German countryside.85 Similarly, model socialist-realist pieces were supposed to 
be nationalist in form. Gerster’s work took the symphonic form, the favorite of 
Beethoven and thus the most important Germanic form, and made no major 
alterations.86 Therefore, the acceptable “revolutionary” soundtrack ended up sounding 
much like national music of earlier periods while the pieces that did sound 
“experimental” were disliked. Perhaps they did not establish enough sign associations 
or established too many negative ones. Ultimately, it seems Gerster’s work established a 
visceral connection with the audience – what they had been looking for all along from 
the classical community - while the other composers had composed progressive, 
cerebral pieces. These designations display a pre-established cultural system – a Plinko 
board geared towards certain works - that appeared to be combatting most of the pieces 
that were performed at Musikfest. 
In any case, the association of these pieces to socialism was in no way inherent. 
March-like passages, satirical jazz riffs, and powerful melodies can only say so much 
on their own. Instead of the pieces building a connection to socialism themselves, the 
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Musikfest program was the main instigator of symbolic interpretation. It showed that the 
government was entering into the hallowed ground of German culture to force-feed 
interpretations to the audience. In effect, the program’s rhetoric was meant to be the 
funnel in the Plinko board, guiding the tokens to the desired outcome. In this case, the 
desired result would have been the audience’s understanding that the pieces were meant 
for them and that they represented the magnificent pinnacle of German socialist-realist 
culture. That learned association ideally would have connected admiration with 
socialism. However, even if the audience read the program, it seems that most Plinko 
tokens landed in the undesired outcome. Ultimately, the program’s suggested symbolic 
interpretations did not matter because the works, which seemed to not build enough 
favor with iconic and indexical signs, were not enjoyed. The systems of interpretation 
that audience members brought with them into the hall confounded composers’ efforts 
to introduce new signs and redefine old ones. 
Why would socialist music (or music in general, for that matter) have such 
signifying potential? Music is largely interpretational, unlike other sign systems. For 
example, language is regulated by symbolic associations. In fact, onomatopoeia exists 
so we can refer to words that break this general rule. Thus, while a signifying process 
such as language has much potential, it often lacks facets of other non-symbolic 
languages. Music represents a landscape full of abstract signs that can be redefined. 
Because of its reliance on mainly iconic and indexical associations, music tends to 
cause different reactions than other languages. Turino states that these sign systems 
have “greater potential” for generating emotion-based responses and postponing or 
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eschewing symbolic thinking.87 Therefore, the rewiring of musical-emotional signs is 
more promising and may experience less rational criticism than the redefining of 
language. At this point, the quote from Republic seems much less distant. In the words 
of Glaucon, such an art of conversion can be presumed, but with an added caveat: it 
cannot merely rely on strong rhetoric. An art of conversion must make people feel 
converted, not just think that they are. 
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Chapter II: The West Side 
“Success depends on traditional prejudices, objective connections between nations, and the changing level of popular irritability. No matter how skilful [sic] the propagandist may be in organizing his staff, selecting suggestions, and exploiting instruments of transmission, his manipulative skill will go for nought [sic] if there is no favorable juxtaposition of social forces to aid him.”  -Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War  
Trouble in Paradise 
In September 1953, Arthur Burns, a top economic advisor to the White House, 
alerted President Eisenhower that the United States’ economy was entering a recession. 
The stock market experienced a sharp decline in activity, businesses failed at an 
abnormal rate, and the average workweek shortened.88 However, despite all of the bad 
signs, Burns was “not alarmed.”89 He saw this as a decline caused by the end of the 
Korean War, and as something that should not trouble the administration.90 By 1954, 
however, the situation looked much worse. Industrial production and GNP declined. 
Unemployment had ballooned from 1.3 million to 3.7 million.91 Eisenhower directed 
Burns to “prepare for worse conditions than anticipated.”92 The administration began to 
look into public works projects that could get people back to work and revitalize the 
American economy.93 Loose monetary policy was eventually employed to increase 
credit and lower interest rates.94 By September 1954, things were looking up. Industrial 
outputs and housing projects rose.95 It seemed that the financial problem had been 
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solved. In the Economic Report of the President, 1955 the report happily declared that 
“wise and early action can stave off serious difficulties later,” but also included that 
monetary policy can be powerful instrument only if “the confidence of consumers and 
businessmen in the future remains high.”96 Despite the feeling of success and the 
lessons present in the report, the economy would suffer two more recessions under the 
Eisenhower administration. 
Why was the American economy able to fix a recession and celebrate it within a 
year only to fall into another one a few years later? This phenomenon can be viewed 
alongside the concurrent issues faced by the GDR. Both societies were experiencing 
social rupture that needed to see a state-sponsored response to reestablish social unity. 
Of course, the issues in the GDR were disgruntled workers protesting in the streets. In 
the United States, citizens were simply not economically active. Instead of an even keel, 
the system was suffering from grand shocks of confidence and anxiety. It was easy to 
lose confidence, but it was also easy to gain it back. How could it be so easy to gain it 
back? 
It seems that the government was directly responsible for the confidence gains. 
As outlined in the 1955 report, they were completely aware that confidence needed to 
remain high for a stable economy. But just a study of monetary policy obfuscates other 
possible factors at play in the American financial woes of the 1950s. Confidence did not 
rebound simply because of economic policy. And, by moving into an exploration of 
propaganda and ideology, it seems regaining social confidence was something that the 
American government had the theory and the ability to do.                                                         
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The administration had to thank their political predecessors for that. Similar to 
the groundwork laid in the GDR for socialist cultural events, the U.S. government had 
established propaganda institutions that could disseminate information in effective 
manners. In fact, Americans had been studying propaganda and the government had 
been employing their methods since World War I. As noted by Kenneth Osgood in 
Total Cold War, “total war had fueled a propaganda revolution.”97 Of all of these post-
World War I studies, Harold Lasswell’s Propaganda Technique in the World War from 
1927 was a seminal work. While he wrote of the importance of demoralizing enemies, 
domestic propaganda was even more important. As Osgood notes within Lasswell’s 
work, psychological warfare against the enemy was important, but “maintaining the 
morale of one’s own soldiers, citizens, and allies was indispensable.”98 
Propaganda scholars and politicians continued to champion propaganda as the 
most important form of persuasion leading to the formation of the first government 
propaganda institutions. FDR led the propaganda charge. In the lead up to World War 
II, he created both the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), 
which was meant to halt Nazi campaigns in Latin American and the Office of War 
Information during his presidency, which was the distributor of “factually based yet 
appropriately slanted news.”99 In 1942, General Eisenhower formed his own military 
propaganda organization called the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB).100 Once the 
war had been won, these World War II organizations spawned new institutions with 
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newly established policies and techniques. Truman formed his own propaganda arms 
which had clear goals for fighting the new Cold War. The national security of the 
United States would not be based on weapons but “industrial infrastructure, raw 
materials, and skilled labor.”101 Propaganda would then be employed to speak of these 
triumphs. That is, the American economy would lead the country to victory and its 
successes would be disseminated throughout the world. However, the Communists 
began making gains across the globe, causing American politicians to reconsider their 
propaganda techniques. In 1950, this policy was revamped in light of the Chinese 
Revolution and the Soviet’s construction of an atomic bomb.102  The new plan came 
from Paul Nitze, the newly appointed head of the Policy Planning staff. Military build-
up would now be a shield for the deployment of nonmilitary resources, namely 
propaganda. The new policy culminated in the paper NSC-68, which portrayed the Cold 
War as a “‘total’ struggle demanding sacrifices and contributions from all Americans 
and further advocated intense campaigns of public persuasion at home ‘to strengthen the 
moral fiber of the people.’”103 
Under Eisenhower, who was already experienced with propaganda from his 
military years, psychological warfare remained a “key element” of government activity, 
and he put greater emphasis on domestic propaganda.104 After his election, it seems that 
Eisenhower quickly took to updating the policies of NSC-68. In 1953 he ordered a 
taskforce known as the Jackson Committee to investigate the failures of Truman’s 
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propaganda policies.105 The committee argued that propaganda institutions needed to be 
seen as important as economic success as opposed to simply trumpeters of that success. 
Propaganda needed to be freed so as to be more active and to infiltrate new sectors of 
communication. According to their report, propaganda was not separate from 
diplomatic, economic, and military measures but was an ingredient of them.106 
Psychological warfare would now be part and parcel of every government measure in 
what the Jackson Committee called a “war of words.”107 Ultimately, the taskforce 
claimed, a psychological aspect must be found and exploited in “‘every diplomatic, 
economic, or military policy and action.’”108 
As a result of the Jackson Committee, Eisenhower expanded old propaganda 
institutions and formed new domestic ones, while honing in their message and 
efficiency. These government organizations pumped propagandistic materials into 
domestic and foreign populations. For example, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) 
released many pamphlets filled with facts about American society.109 While these works 
attempted to convince foreign populations that the United States was not experiencing 
class warfare, others focused on convincing the domestic population that they were 
important and lived in the best country under the best system. Domestic propaganda 
campaigns like the 1956 People’s Capitalism exhibition told Americans that they were 
part of a “steady march of progress.”110 Key American philosophy was also highlighted. 
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The exhibit in Washington D.C. explained that the state only existed to serve the 
individual. Similarly, economic prosperity “grew logically from the limited, democratic 
government of the United States.”111 
But even before 1956, the means of propaganda dissemination expanded and 
became more precise. News media was seen as the prime avenue for propaganda 
dissemination because of its perceived objectivity and reach. The era from 1945-1955 
saw the largest newspaper consumption in American history. During this period, each 
household was consuming 1.2 newspapers per day on average during the week.112 
Sunday editions were consumed at a rate of 1.03 per household.113 To put these 
numbers in perspective, they are around triple the rate found in 2010.114 The news 
media could also offer legitimacy to the government’s messages. By placing their 
rhetoric amongst other articles, their propaganda would become “objective, factual” 
news, leading to less suspicion on the part of the reader.115 A situation in which the 
Eisenhower administration and its propaganda wings could harness this system of 
communication would be ideal. But support within the journalist community for 
domestic propaganda had been largely elusive. Eisenhower’s 1953 Operation Candor – 
which was eventually folded in the Atoms for Peace campaign - hoped to change this. 
The operation sought to mobilize domestic support so as to ultimately expand the U.S. 
national defense system. Domestic support, which was suffering because of the 
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economic recession, would be garnered by domestic news agencies, whom first needed 
to be won over or scared into compliance. The government would attempt to convince 
the U.S. news media “that an age of peril existed so that journalists would help 
‘indoctrinate’ the American public.”116 Eventually, the domestic press, radio, television, 
newsreels, and top media executives would be exploited so as to provide a “multiplying 
effort” for Eisenhower’s efforts during the period.117 Once sympathetic to government 
policy, news outlets would attempt to convince the American population that they were 
living “‘not in an instant of peril but in an age of peril.’”118 Therefore, this message 
could be spread efficiently, entering the home of a grand majority of Americans each 
day in the seemingly objective form of a newspaper. 
While the full extent to which Operation Candor was implemented is unknown, 
its underlying philosophy arguably played a role in efforts to relieve the recession. As 
the logic went, every economic policy move had a psychological aspect which should 
be highlighted in domestic populations so as to convince the population of their peril 
and loyalty required to defeat that peril. An article released during the period which 
included presidential rhetoric about the economy would be part and parcel of an 
organized propaganda campaign, especially if it included certain Cold War signifying 
trends. 
While the music of Musikfest was accompanied by an explanatory text that was 
meant to guide listeners to a specific interpretation of the pieces, U.S. propaganda 
institutions released material that informed the public of the grander meaning of their 
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loyalty to the American political and economic system. In effect, these texts were 
attempting to establish a state-sponsored ideology that would inform citizens about the 
importance of their daily economic and cultural activities. These texts had their own 
values to signify. The American texts were “characterized by social mobility, spiritual 
vitality, rugged individualism, equality of opportunity, the rule of law, and widespread 
belief in the virtues of capitalism and democracy.”119 Because of the contemporary 
events and ideologies, these concepts took on new iconic and indexical associations, 
establishing themselves as entirely antithetical to Communism. Ultimately, these stories 
of progress reveal the self-perception of the U.S.’s privileged class during the Cold 
War. The common American, helped along but not dominated by the government, was 
the focus of these texts. The United States was a place where freedom and equality 
reigned, two terms seldom if ever applied by Westerners to the Soviet Union. 
While these themes were constantly present in international propaganda 
campaigns, they also were part of domestic news articles, which very well could not 
have been part of an orchestrated propaganda campaign. Of course, this phenomenon 
displays the power of ideological coercion: “subjective” ideology became the 
“objective” of a society. Their inclusion in these news articles seemed natural. As 
Osgood states, U.S. propaganda officials “generally believed they were telling the truth 
about the United States.”120  
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Reprinting Eisenhower’s Address 
One such article released on October 26, 1954 exemplifies this Cold War logic. 
Arguably, Osgood’s statement could very likely also be made about the editors of the 
New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Daily Tribune who all chose to 
place Eisenhower’s address to the National Security Industrial Association on the front 
pages of their October 26 issues. An objective reporting of the event – that Eisenhower 
did indeed make a speech – and reprinting of the text could seem relatively mundane. 
The speech was a rough overview of the 1954 American economy with emphasis placed 
on how that plays into the strength of the U.S. nation. However, the themes – which 
strike amazing resemblance to the themes found in other U.S. propaganda of the time – 
present in the reprinted speech – as these papers were some of the most widely read in 
the U.S. – were disseminated to tens of millions of loyal readers.121 (The best that 
Musikfest could do was a couple thousand audience members who may or may not have 
read the program.) Thus, while East Germans attended the Musikfest performance, in 
the United States the newspaper and its rhetoric would be the performance with readers 
taking the role of the audience, their surroundings and lives – the physical space in 
which they grappled with established societal conventions, their experiences, the new 
information, and its ideological considerations – becoming the concert hall. Cultural 
and political information would be transmitted, interpreted, and possibly affect the 
material rituals of American individuals. This information would rely heavily on 
                                                        
121 Mark Wilson, “Chicago Tribune,” Encyclopedia of Chicago, 2005, date accessed October 13th, 2016, 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/275.html.; “The Los Angeles Times’ history,” The 
Los Angeles Times, September 21st, 2012, date accessed October 13th, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/la-
mediagroup-times-history-htmlstory.html.; “Our History,” The New York Times, date accessed October 
13th, 2016, http://www.nytco.com/who-we-are/culture/our-history/. 
 
 
41  
established nationalist symbolic, iconic, and indexical associations to the speech’s main 
concepts. Therefore, publicity could act as a means of ideological dissemination, where 
propagandistic messages could easily be transmitted to an engaged population in what 
was perceived as an “objective” medium. Put simply, the format and its “objective 
nature” could support ideological claims. These claims could then be seen as fact or as a 
way of framing people’s daily actions. Because of this ideological framing, Americans’ 
economic activity could now be seen as part and parcel of each individual’s character, 
morality, culture, and patriotism. The performance’s level of success would be made 
apparent by the audience’s reactions. If Americans disparaged the ideological 
considerations offered by the performance like Musikfest audience members, then it 
would be a sign of ideological rejection. However, if they were comparatively more 
agreeable, then it seems the ideological redefinition had found a receptive audience. 
Each of the articles opened with background information on why the speech was 
taking place as well as a summary of the speech’s main points. These introductions also 
reiterated four key figures from the speech: the recent 400,000-person drop in 
unemployment, the possible $3,000 increase in average household income by 1964, a 
total economy of $365 billion, and a commitment to a future economy of $500 within a 
decade.122 Certainly the rise in standard of living and economic revitalization held the 
greatest importance.  
These figures would then be abstracted into arguments based in signs. Three 
main ideological signs are present in the speech: freedom, peace, and faith.   
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Freedom and the individualism required by it was what delineated the American 
worker from the Soviet worker. Communist Russia had become a “threat to individual 
freedom and liberty,”123 unlike the United States labor force which was committed to 
their preservation. This link between individual American workers and their loyalty to 
individualism was made clear. Eisenhower stated that James Forestall, the namesake of 
the award the was the president was accepting that night, correctly knew it was foolish 
to see the American economy as simply a group of powerful companies. Instead, both 
men rightfully saw the American economy as powerful because of “America’s people-
farmers, teachers, shipbuilders, scientists, executives, machinists, truck drivers, all 
living under a system that encourages individualism.”124 Everyone had their part to play 
in the American political economy, and they would not be forced to labor in a certain 
way by the government. By tapping into people’s “inherent” individualism, the United 
States was actually promoting the best system possible. Near the end of his speech, 
Eisenhower made a “forecast” for the American economy which continued to highlight 
the importance of freedom. Eisenhower claimed that overall future economic progress 
and “maximum opportunity to enjoy good health and a good job, a good home and a 
good education, a rising standard of living” depended on three “basic facts.”125 The first 
of those was “our free way of life.”126 The fact that America was free would lead to 
prosperity. 
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Eisenhower also told the American population that the push for a $500 billion 
economy at home would expand freedom across the globe. By expanding markets 
abroad, “the security and solidarity of the free world” would be reinforced for “our 
economy can grow only as part, though a vastly important part, of a growing free world 
economy.”127 Put simply, American economic incursions in foreign markets were the 
best way to fight Communism without fighting Communism. 
In Eisenhower’s view, the “great free economy of America” was the ultimate 
source of the United States citizens’ freedom.128 But it was not only that freedom and 
individualism ensured American success, American success reciprocally ensured 
American freedom and individualism. The logic was simple: the economy was the 
“source of our military strength” and “unless this economy were kept healthy, strong 
and expanding, there would be for the free world neither victory in war nor security in 
peace.”129 That is, how could a free world with a lackluster economy expect to defend 
itself from the military might of imperialist Communism? The Soviets would simply 
outproduce the Americans and slowly expand their military presence until freedom and 
individualism were gone. 
In the most sublime example of doublethink, Americans would have to destroy 
this threat with peace. However, peace was already ironically fraught with issues. For 
the American people in 1954, peace signified the entire 1953 recession and its bigger, 
scarier brother, the Great Depression.130 Americans were afraid that their society would 
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slip into another depression without a war to keep it afloat. Since Americans from the 
war years had “blighted confidence” and “warped economic behavior” because the 
American economy had been weakest following World War I and most prosperous 
during World War II, their belief was that a post-WWII economy would collapse once 
again.131 The last time that Americans had peace after a world war, they suffered their 
greatest economic disaster. While the Soviet Union established its factories, the United 
States foundered.132 It was a time when capitalism experienced some of its greatest 
critiques. Thus, Americans met peace after World War II with fear. And as seen, the 
American economy experienced difficulties in 1952-1953. It seemed that everyone’s 
fears were confirmed. While Eisenhower wanted a strong peace to be the goal of 
economic activity, Americans could not move past their anxiety. Eisenhower assured 
“security in peace” as long as Americans could replace their emotional association of 
peace with economic apocalypse with the doublethink that he proposed.133 
He suggested that peace needed to be redefined within the Cold War context. 
Peace would no longer signify a period of collapse, but come to be a shorthand 
embodiment of si vis pacem, fac bellum (“If you want peace, make war.”). Thus, 
Eisenhower suggested that peace at this point in history would be a euphemism for the 
end and its mean. The end was global cooperation that would rise after the means – the 
Soviet Union’s containment, collapse, and destruction via economic and military 
might.134 As he finished his speech, he wished to reveal one “thought, the most 
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important of all.”135 Eisenhower steeped this thought in the euphemistic language of the 
time: “It is only when we win the struggle for permanent peace can we devote the full 
power of this mighty country of ours to the advancement of human happiness.”136 
That struggle, as Eisenhower clarified, would be in the mind of each and every 
American. Their weapon would be their faith. For the system to triumph, faith would be 
required down to the last man, woman, and child. Eisenhower claimed that the “state of 
our national economy is largely a national state of mind.”137 When the American 
individual felt confident, the economy was strong. When the American individual felt 
discouraged, the economy was weak. Therefore, in an era of total mobilization, each 
and every mind had to be confident to achieve victory. Thus, rather like redirecting a 
Plinko token, Eisenhower wished to assert his more positive view on the nation’s 
economy, that “America’s prosperity does not necessarily depend on war’s 
sacrifices.”138 The economy could succeed as long as the American individual replaced 
their anxiety with faith. As he noted, America’s economic future depended on tapping 
into the “treasure house of energy,” which was the very “brains and confidence of all 
163,000,000 of our people.”139 While the message may be seen as a call for the 
government to listen to their population, it can also be examined as an expectation of 
the American worker. In the most sympathetic light, Eisenhower was asking the 
government to listen to its peoples’ whims so that they would be productive, confident 
members of society that could defend itself. In the most cynical interpretation, 
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Eisenhower’s message to the American was find their faith and fall in line or otherwise 
their economy would lose to the Communists. 
The 1953 recession had shown that confidence was not as high in the United 
States as it needed to be, but Eisenhower was confident that a depression had been 
avoided and the recession would be ended with proper application of economic 
strategies. A full blown panic was avoided because confidence had been injected into 
the American populace properly, and the situation would certainly continue to improve. 
As Eisenhower remarked, the “objective” of the 1953 economic measures was to 
“maintain confidence among consumers and investors, among business men and 
working people.”140 He eventually closed the case on the economic downturn: “And the 
result? This year 1954 is our most prosperous peacetime year in all our history.”141 
Ultimately, Eisenhower suggested that every American was dependent upon a 
strong economy, and that strong economy depended upon the individual’s mindset. It 
was a lofty suggestion. However, whether or not Eisenhower’s analysis was believable 
was beside the point. His interpretation would work if Americans believed it would 
work. He had faith that his interpretation was correct, and he exuded the confidence that 
all Americans should emulate and maintain. With the general populace mirroring 
Eisenhower’s confidence, his prophecy would be fulfilled. His expectations were 
manifested in a symbolic struggle for freedom, peace, and confidence within the mind 
of every single American worker. The American worker had their marching orders. 
Their confidence in American economic activity would be their ultimate weapon in the 
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battle for their mind. And if they believed in the effectiveness of that weapon to destroy 
the enemy of economic stagnation, then they would surely find the highest form of 
freedom and peace waiting for them in the United States once Communism had been 
defeated. Eisenhower concluded that “[w]ith this strength, with this confidence, our 
nation will be fortified in its quest for world peace–a quest that must never cease, never 
slacken, until the final goal has been attained.”142 
America Revitalizes with Ease 
By November 23, 1954 the Dow Jones climbed to 381 points, the first time it 
had risen to that level since 1929.143 Not only had the American economy finally 
recovered from its Great Depression, but it had dodged potential financial panic in 
1954. This economic resurgence can, of course, not merely be attributed to 
Eisenhower’s address being printed in popular newspapers. But the Cold War logic 
about economics and faith presented in an article format represented a trend in effective 
and consistent information dissemination with emphasis put on concepts that 
distinguished American and their system from Communism. 
This trend, which had begun before 1954 but was intensified then, had laid the 
groundwork for a receptive population. Americans had already been reading 
newspapers at an astounding rate. Therefore, as Althusser would likely say, the material 
ritual required for ideological coercion was already present before Eisenhower’s address 
was even reprinted. But this was not the only factor. 
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Certain scholars rightly call these years from 1945-1955 the “Age of 
Consensus.”144 While this label is most often used to explain Americans’ comradery in 
their battle against Communism or as a derogatory term explaining the conformity of 
the period, its underlying suggestion is worth exploring. Perhaps it should not be looked 
at as a consensus of opinion, but more of a consensus on ideology, particularly its 
associated material rituals. The phrase implies social confidence, a word that is part and 
parcel of economic growth, in the way that Americans did things then. And during this 
period, the self-sustaining confidence and the simplicity of reinvigorating that 
confidence was likely unprecedented. A 1952 study revealed the extent of this domestic 
confidence in the American populace. One part of the study focused on beliefs in 
opportunity and social class. The researchers asked participants if they felt “there is 
much or pretty much opportunity to get ahead in America.”145 The percentage of 
respondents who affirmed that position was consistently above 75%.146 Those who 
labelled their occupations as professional or semi-professional were quite enthusiastic, 
with 91% stating they agreed.147 Even the percentage of those who were unemployed – 
where one might expect to see the lowest percentages – was 69%.148 It seems that 
Americans were confident in their economy and their potential to get ahead.149 
 The trend of confidence continued with presidential approval ratings. While they 
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Truman had an abysmal approval rating of 22% in 1951.150 Eisenhower then inherited 
the low approval, experiencing a rating of 28% the following year.151 However, by 
1953, Eisenhower’s annual average rating had jumped up to around 70%, one of the 
highest ratings since Gallup began tracking presidential approval ratings in 1945.152 
Therefore, it seems the heavy lifting had been done before Eisenhower took 
office. The ability for confidence to rebound in the United States was simply engrained 
before the 1953 recession. It could be one had to simply organize a small propaganda 
campaign in tandem with normal monetary policy shifts and economic issues would 
evaporate. In effect, the message became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Its expectations set 
the foundation upon which Americans would assimilate or “reassimilate” their behavior 
in accordance with the new or reasserted expectations. In sociology, this could be 
labelled as behavioral confirmation. Within a study of ideology, this just seems like a 
system of which had truly made concrete individuals into concrete subjects. 
Whether one buys the current arguments and theory of ideology, it is easy to 
recognize the intense propaganda efforts that were occurring in the United States in 
1954. Instead of an isolated event, this economic pep talk was part of a wider network 
of propagandistic “objective” news articles that were meant to motivate the American 
public and instill in them the belief that their free market ran by private interests would 
defeat Communism. This was not merely a statement made in a vacuum. It was an 
assertion that the U.S. system was better than the Soviet system. It was an insertion into 
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the mind of every newspaper-reading American that the economy depended upon their 
individual actions. The public was informed that their labor power needed to be 
mobilized in a global economic conflict. 
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Conclusion: To Inform is to Direct 
“…under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies.”  -Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish  
For Americans – who have normally been taught to recognize and scoff at 
Communist rhetoric – the ideology wrapped up in the program is obvious. This point 
was wonderfully illustrated when my quotes from the program text drew laughter from 
the crowd at my first presentation on Musikfest. The ideology present in the case of 
Eisenhower’s address may be comparatively less obvious, obfuscated by the “objective” 
medium but more importantly by our relative familiarity with the philosophical 
components of capitalism. And I make this point not as an interesting aside, but as a 
core example of my argument: The ideology of Eisenhower’s time, albeit with 
alterations, remains to this day. Of course, it is not often labelled as ideology but instead 
reality. That makes complete sense in that those who follow a certain ideology believe 
in it. That is truth to them. Just as the audience’s accustomed tastes were not satisfied by 
the selections at Musikfest or just as American propagandists at the USIA believed they 
were disseminating truth about the United States with each pamphlet or as the figures 
about the U.S. economy in Eisenhower’s speech were accurate, subjects feel their 
ideology is correct and true. To have questioned the Musikfest audience’s established 
tastes would have been to jump down the ideological rabbit hole where reasoning, 
feeling, and experience are intertwined to the point of opacity. Their thoughts on the 
music were set before they even walked into the concert hall. Nationalism played a 
grand role in these established feelings, hence why GDR composers felt the need to 
 
 
52  
engage with it. It could also be why their attempts ultimately failed. Conversely, it 
could be said that because of nationalism, the belief in capitalism was present in the 
United States long before Eisenhower’s address was even printed. Was it simply that 
while one government was attuned to the natural economic feelings of their populace, 
the other was oblivious to the natural cultural feelings of their own people? Or could it 
be that both states were weaving between opinions about culture and economics that 
had been established by nationalism, previous personal experiences, and state policy 
while trying to guide these interpretations to, from the respective states’ perspective, 
more helpful definitions? The latter question seems to be borne out by the analysis here. 
Americans were afraid of “peacetime capitalism,” but their fears were swayed towards 
more positive associations as the Cold War progressed. Their distaste and anxiety about 
capitalism seemed to be a natural reaction to the Great Depression, but they were 
convinced to remain a subject of it. The receptivity of the two populations examined 
here is paramount. In other words, a population’s receptiveness or lack thereof should 
not be seen as a simply natural phenomena or as if their support for an idea had been 
under the surface waiting to burst forth once the state recognized it. Support was found 
because the population’s receptiveness had been constructed before these events even 
took place, often through confidence in arguments of nationalism founded on specific 
concepts with complex networks of symbolic, iconic, and indexical associations. The 
building of ideology required these states to reckon with past constructions of ideology, 
and if those past constructions included general receptiveness to the governments that 
were building these ideologies then the task was made simpler. 
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But then the question becomes, where, when, and how were these cultural 
tendencies and tastes first formed? This question is devilishly difficult to answer 
effectively not simply because no single ideological creation point exists, but also 
because often the supposed truth is so self-evident that it becomes difficult to recognize 
how one is surrounded by it and directed by it. This statement can be illuminated by the 
opening to David Foster Wallace’s “This is Water”: 
There are these two young fish swimming along, and they happen to 
meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says, 
"Morning, boys, how's the water?" And the two young fish swim on for a 
bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes, 
"What the hell is water?"153 
As revealed in this thesis, this feeling that the state’s perception of reality was true was 
not present at Musikfest. Most attendees did not feel for the music they heard, likely 
causing them to disregard the interpretations offered by the text, if they read them at all. 
It appears that this description may be more aptly applied to the analysis American 
newspaper readers. 
However, despite differences in effectiveness of these two ideological 
construction attempts, both were attempting to convince the same audience. Each state 
was attempting to connect with their labor force. The GDR, for obvious practical and 
ideological reasons, was hoping to build a relationship with their workers so as to gain 
their support in the socialist revolution. The U.S. government wanted to sway their 
workers in order to shield them from the message of that socialist revolution. Thus, 
workers in 1954 were a hot commodity. Their loyalty and the productive power that 
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came with it was extremely important to both states in their competition against the 
other’s economic capabilities. 
To return to and answer Andrew Port’s question: Based on this thesis, the West 
was able to convey a more effective message, at least during the period in question. The 
U.S. ideology seems to have been more able to maintain and mobilize its productive 
forces. The ideology of the GDR, on the other hand, was unable to convince many of its 
workers, and was consistently hemorrhaging labor forces. To use Wallace’s imagery, 
perhaps disenfranchised East Germans began to swim for different waters even as GDR 
ideology thawed, while Americans were content with their water or were otherwise 
unaware of it. 
But this study about a specific day in history can hopefully spark thoughts of the 
current state of affairs. Could ideology still be working in the shadows – unnoticed like 
water to Wallace’s fish – now in what some scholars have called the post-ideological 
age? David Welch argued in 1999 that propaganda differed from information and 
education. As he noted, “propaganda is distinct from information – which seeks to 
transmit facts objectively – and from education, which hopes to open up its students’ 
minds.”154 The point of propaganda, he proposed, was to “persuade its subject or public 
of one point of view; and to close off other options.”155 These points reveal their own 
ideological underpinnings: Welch believed that objectivity was attainable, and that 
“facts” or information can be taught or disseminated in a manner that is not persuasive 
or laden with ideological considerations. Kenneth Osgood affirmed these points in his 
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2012 discussion of propaganda, suggesting that these definitions still hold sway.156 
Based off of the two previous analyses, however, Welch’s points are questionable. I 
wish to propose a counterargument. To inform is to persuade, and to persuade is to 
direct. In other words, no information and its medium of presentation is free from 
ideological considerations by the creator, disseminator, or viewer. And, in fact, to 
believe that information can be free from ideology is to be predisposed to be more 
receptive to its persuasive messages for, like a fish in water, the ideological medium 
that humans live in will affect the way they behave and how they chose to “go” whether 
or not they are aware of it. 
Let us put the problematic word of propaganda aside. Whether information is 
found in a program of a music festival, revealed in the interpretations of the audience, 
or printed in a newspaper, it went through decisions about presentation. That is, what 
was important to the organizer or performer either for personal reasons, to please a boss 
or colleague, or their audience, was informed by their status as a subject to some 
ideological apparatus. In both of the cases examined in this thesis, the organizers were 
working as representatives of the state. They formed texts to accompany performances, 
both literal and figurative. Much like a key found on a map that explains the 
significance and required interpretation to succeed at reading the map, these texts 
offered interpretations that assured success to their readers as long as the signifying 
interpretations were followed. As such the didactic texts that they disseminated into 
their respective, if I may propose a new term, cultural arenas (a means of 
communication run by an ideological apparatus with the hope of establishing or                                                         
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reproducing material rituals, or a performance accompanied by a text) were laden with 
state ideology. On October 26, 1954, the concert hall in Leipzig became a cultural 
arena, and the American breakfast table became a cultural arena. Each had their text, 
their material ritual, their audience, and their venue. The program text wished to 
redefine certain sonic characteristics in socialist terms. The newspaper article wished to 
redefine signs in a new Cold War context. These interpretations would then lead to new 
material rituals, where East Germans enjoyed socialism and its music, and Americans 
were more economically confident and active. Ultimately, because the proposed 
ideology was too weak, the audience was ideologically predisposed to being 
unreceptive, or a combination of those two factors, the East German ideology failed to 
do this. On the other side of the Atlantic, the American ideology succeeded. Its 
suggestions found an already receptive audience. This conclusion will hopefully elicit 
further exploration in not only the ideology that lost and the ideology that won, but the 
ideology of information past and current.
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